CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT.
No. 91-744.
505 U.S. 833; 112 S. Ct. 2791; 120 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1992)
April 22, 1992, Argued
June 29, 1992, Decided *
* Together with No. 91-902, Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al.
v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania et al., also on certiorari to the same
court.
Court Cases
Index
O'Conner, Kennedy and Souter's Court Opinion 1
O'Conner, Kennedy and Souter's Court Opinion 2
O'Conner, Kennedy and Souter's Court Opinion 3
O'Conner, Kennedy and Souter's Court Opinion 4
O'Conner, Kennedy and Souter's Court Opinion 5
O'Conner, Kennedy and Souter's Court Appendix
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion 1
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion 2
Stevens, concurring in part, dissenting in part
Scalia, concurring in part , dissenting in part
Blackmun, concurring in part, dissenting in part
Syllabus:
At issue are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control
Act of 1982: § 3205, which requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed
consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain
information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed; § 3206, which mandates
the informed consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but provides a
judicial bypass procedure; § 3209, which commands that, unless certain exceptions apply,
a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified
her husband; § 3203, which defines a "medical emergency" that will excuse
compliance with the foregoing requirements; and § 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f), which
impose certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services. Before
any of the provisions took effect, the petitioners, five abortion clinics and a physician
representing himself and a class of doctors who provide abortion services, brought this
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that each of the provisions was unconstitutional on
its face, as well as injunctive relief. The District Court held all the provisions
unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in part and reversed in part, striking down the husband notification provision
but upholding the others.
Held: The judgment in No. 91-902 is affirmed; the judgment in
No. 91-744 is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded.
947 F.2d 682: No. 91-902, affirmed; No. 91-744, affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, concluding that consideration
of the fundamental constitutional question resolved by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
principles of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis require that
Roe's essential holding be retained [505 U.S. 833, 834] and reaffirmed as to each of its
three parts: (1) a recognition of a woman's right to choose to have an abortion before
fetal viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State, whose
pre-viability interests are not strong enough to support an abortion prohibition or the
imposition of substantial obstacles to the woman's effective right to elect the procedure;
(2) a confirmation of the State's power to restrict abortions after viability, if the law
contains exceptions for pregnancies endangering a woman's life or health; and (3) the
principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child. Pp.
844-869.
(a) A reexamination of the principles that define the woman's rights
and the State's authority regarding abortions is required by the doubt this Court's
subsequent decisions have cast upon the meaning and reach of Roe's central holding, by the
fact that THE CHIEF JUSTICE would overrule Roe, and by the necessity that state and
federal courts and legislatures have adequate guidance on the subject. Pp. 844-845.
(b) Roe determined that a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy is a "liberty" protected against state interference by the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Neither the Bill of
Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's
adoption marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of such "liberty."
Rather, the adjudication of substantive due process claims may require this Court to
exercise its reasoned judgment in determining the boundaries between the individual's
liberty and the demands of organized society. The Court's decisions have afforded
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, see, e.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,
family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, child rearing and education,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, and contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, and have recognized the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453. Roe's central
holding properly invoked the reasoning and tradition of these precedents. Pp. 846-853.
(c) Application of the doctrine of stare decisis confirms
that Roe's essential holding should be reaffirmed. In reexamining that holding, the
Court's judgment is informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations
designed to test the consistency of overruling the holding with the ideal of the rule of
law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling. Pp. 854-855. [505
U.S. 833, 835]
(d) Although Roe has engendered opposition, it has in no sense
proven unworkable, representing as it does a simple limitation beyond which a state law is
unenforceable. P. 835.
(e) The Roe rule's limitation on state power could not be repudiated
without serious inequity to people who, for two decades of economic and social
developments, have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their
views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of
abortion in the event that contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives. The Constitution serves human values, and
while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain
costs of overruling Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living around that
case be dismissed. Pp. 855-856.
(f) No evolution of legal principle has left Roe's central rule a
doctrinal anachronism discounted by society. If Roe is placed among the cases exemplified
by Griswold, supra, it is clearly in no jeopardy, since subsequent constitutional
developments have neither disturbed, nor do they threaten to diminish, the liberty
recognized in such cases. Similarly, if Roe is seen as stating a rule of personal autonomy
and bodily integrity, akin to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate
medical treatment or to bar its rejection, this Court's post-Roe decisions accord with
Roe's view that a State's interest in the protection of life falls short of justifying any
plenary override of individual liberty claims. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, M. Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278. Finally, if Roe is classified as sui generis, there clearly has
been no erosion of its central determination. It was expressly reaffirmed in Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (Akron I), and Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747; and, in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, a majority either voted to reaffirm or
declined to address the constitutional validity of Roe's central holding. Pp. 857-859.
(g) No change in Roe's factual underpinning has left its central
holding obsolete, and none supports an argument for its overruling. Although subsequent
maternal health care advances allow for later abortions safe to the pregnant woman, and
post-Roe neonatal care developments have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier,
these facts go only to the scheme of time limits on the realization of competing
interests. Thus, any later divergences from the factual premises of Roe have no bearing on
the validity of its central holding, that viability marks the earliest point at which the
State's interest in fetal [505 U.S. 833, 836] life is constitutionally adequate to justify
a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions. The soundness or unsoundness of that
constitutional judgment in no sense turns on when viability occurs. Whenever it may occur,
its attainment will continue to serve as the critical fact. Pp. 860.
(h) A comparison between Roe and two decisional lines of comparable
significance - the line identified with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, and the line
that began with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 - confirms the result reached here. Those
lines were overruled - by, respectively, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 - on the basis of facts, or an understanding
of facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier
constitutional resolutions. The overruling decisions were comprehensible to the Nation,
and defensible, as the Court's responses to changed circumstances. In contrast, because
neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor this Court's understanding
of it has changed (and because no other indication of weakened precedent has been shown),
the Court could not pretend to be reexamining Roe with any justification beyond a present
doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Roe Court. That is an inadequate
basis for overruling a prior case. Pp. 861-864.
(i) Overruling Roe's central holding would not only reach an
unjustifiable result under stare decisis principles, but would seriously weaken the
Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a
Nation dedicated to the rule of law. Where the Court acts to resolve the sort of unique,
intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe, its decision has a dimension not present
in normal cases, and is entitled to rare precedential force to counter the inevitable
efforts to overturn it and to thwart its implementation. Only the most convincing
justification under accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a
later decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to political pressure and
an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court staked its authority in the
first instance. Moreover, the country's loss of confidence in the Judiciary would be
underscored by condemnation for the Court's failure to keep faith with those who support
the decision at a cost to themselves. A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under
the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both
profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy and to the Nation's commitment
to the rule of law. Pp. 864-869.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE SOUTER concluded in
Part IV that an examination of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, and [505 U.S. 833, 837]
subsequent cases, reveals a number of guiding principles that should control the
assessment of the Pennsylvania statute:
(a) To protect the central right recognized by Roe while at the same
time accommodating the State's profound interest in potential life, see id., at
162, the undue burden standard should be employed. An undue burden exists, and therefore a
provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.
(b) Roe's rigid trimester framework is rejected. To promote the
State's interest in potential life throughout pregnancy, the State may take measures to
ensure that the woman's choice is informed. Measures designed to advance this interest
should not be invalidated if their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth
over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the right.
(c) As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations
to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion, but may not impose
unnecessary health regulations that present a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
abortion.
(d) Adoption of the undue burden standard does not disturb Roe's
holding that, regardless of whether exceptions are made for particular circumstances, a
State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her
pregnancy before viability.
(e) Roe's holding that "subsequent to viability, the State, in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother" is also
reaffirmed. Id., at 164-165. Pp. 869-879.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts V-A and V-C, concluding that:
1. As construed by the Court of Appeals, § 3203's medical emergency
definition is intended to assure that compliance with the State's abortion regulations
would not in any way pose a significant threat to a woman's life or health, and thus does
not violate the essential holding of Roe, supra, at 164. Although the definition
could be interpreted in an unconstitutional manner, this Court defers to lower federal
court interpretations of state law unless they amount to "plain" error. Pp.
879-880.
2. Section 3209's husband notification provision constitutes an
undue burden, and is therefore invalid. A significant number of women will likely be
prevented from obtaining an abortion just as surely as if Pennsylvania had outlawed the
procedure entirely. The fact that § 3209 may affect fewer than one percent of women
seeking abortions does not save it from facial invalidity, since the proper focus of
constitutional inquiry [505 U.S. 833, 838] is the group for whom the law is a restriction,
not the group for whom it is irrelevant. Furthermore, it cannot be claimed that the
father's interest in the fetus' welfare is equal to the mother's protected liberty, since
it is an inescapable biological fact that state regulation with respect to the fetus will
have a far greater impact on the pregnant woman's bodily integrity than it will on the
husband. Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common law status of
married women, but repugnant to this Court's present understanding of marriage and of the
nature of the rights secured by the Constitution. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69. Pp. 887-898.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE SOUTER, joined by
JUSTICE STEVENS, concluded in Part V-E that all of the statute's record keeping and
reporting requirements, except that relating to spousal notice, are constitutional. The
reporting provision relating to the reasons a married woman has not notified her husband
that she intends to have an abortion must be invalidated, because it places an undue
burden on a woman's choice. Pp. 900-901.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE SOUTER concluded in
Parts V-B and V-D that:
1. Section 3205's informed consent provision is not an undue burden
on a woman's constitutional right to decide to terminate a pregnancy. To the extent Akron
I, 462 U.S., at 444, and Thornburgh, 476 U.S., at 762, find a constitutional violation
when the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading
information about the nature of the abortion procedure, the attendant health risks and
those of childbirth, and the "probable gestational age" of the fetus, those
cases are inconsistent with Roe's acknowledgment of an important interest in potential
life, and are overruled. Requiring that the woman be informed of the availability of
information relating to the consequences to the fetus does not interfere with a
constitutional right of privacy between a pregnant woman and her physician, since the
doctor-patient relation is derivative of the woman's position, and does not underlie or
override the abortion right. Moreover, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak
are implicated only as part of the practice of medicine, which is licensed and regulated
by the State. There is no evidence here that requiring a doctor to give the required
information would amount to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion. The
premise behind Akron I's invalidation of a waiting period between the provision of the
information deemed necessary to informed consent and the performance of an abortion, 462
U.S., at 450, is also wrong. Although § 3205's 24-hour waiting period may make some
abortions more expensive and less convenient, it cannot be said that it is invalid [505
U.S. 833, 839] on the present record and in the context of this facial challenge. Pp.
881-887.
2. Section 3206's one-parent consent requirement and judicial bypass
procedure are constitutional. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497
U.S. 502, 510-519. Pp. 899-900.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN concluded that application of the strict scrutiny
standard of review required by this Court's abortion precedents results in the
invalidation of all the challenged provisions in the Pennsylvania statute, including the
reporting requirements, and therefore concurred in the judgment that the requirement that
a pregnant woman report her reasons for failing to provide spousal notice is
unconstitutional. Pp. 830, 934-936.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and
JUSTICE THOMAS, concluded that:
1. Although Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, is not directly implicated by
the Pennsylvania statute, which simply regulates, and does not prohibit, abortion, a
reexamination of the "fundamental right" Roe accorded to a woman's decision to
abort a fetus, with the concomitant requirement that any state regulation of abortion
survive "strict scrutiny," id., at 154-156, is warranted by the confusing
and uncertain state of this Court's post-Roe decisional law. A review of post-Roe cases
demonstrates both that they have expanded upon Roe in imposing increasingly greater
restrictions on the States, see Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 783 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), and that the Court has become
increasingly more divided, none of the last three such decisions having commanded a
majority opinion, see Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502; Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417; Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490. This
confusion and uncertainty complicated the task of the Court of Appeals, which concluded
that the "undue burden" standard adopted by JUSTICE O'CONNOR in Webster and
Hodgson governs the present cases. Pp. 944-951.
2. The Roe Court reached too far when it analogized the right to
abort a fetus to the rights involved in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1; and Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, and thereby deemed the right to abortion to be "fundamental." None
of these decisions endorsed an all-encompassing "right of privacy," as Roe,
supra, at 152-153, claimed. Because abortion involves the purposeful termination of
potential life, the abortion decision must be recognized as sui generis, different in kind
from the rights protected in the earlier cases under the rubric of personal or family
privacy and autonomy. And the historical traditions of the American people - as evidenced
by the English common [505 U.S. 833, 840] law and by the American abortion statutes in
existence both at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption and Roe's issuance - do
not support the view that the right to terminate one's pregnancy is
"fundamental." Thus, enactments abridging that right need not be subjected to
strict scrutiny. Pp. 951-953.
3. The undue burden standard adopted by the joint opinion of
JUSTICES O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER has no basis in constitutional law, and will not
result in the sort of simple limitation, easily applied, which the opinion anticipates. To
evaluate abortion regulations under that standard, judges will have to make the
subjective, unguided determination whether the regulations place "substantial
obstacles" in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, undoubtedly engendering a
variety of conflicting views. The standard presents nothing more workable than the
trimester framework the joint opinion discards, and will allow the Court, under the guise
of the Constitution, to continue to impart its own preferences on the States in the form
of a complex abortion code. Pp. 964-966.
4. The correct analysis is that set forth by the plurality opinion
in Webster, supra: a woman's interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in ways
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. P. 966.
5. Section 3205's requirements are rationally related to the State's
legitimate interest in assuring that a woman's consent to an abortion be fully informed.
The requirement that a physician disclose certain information about the abortion procedure
and its risks and alternatives is not a large burden, and is clearly related to maternal
health and the State's interest in informed consent. In addition, a State may rationally
decide that physicians are better qualified than counselors to impart this information and
answer questions about the abortion alternatives' medical aspects. The requirement that
information be provided about the availability of paternal child support and state-funded
alternatives is also related to the State's informed consent interest, and furthers the
State's interest in preserving unborn life. That such information might create some
uncertainty and persuade some women to forgo abortions only demonstrates that it might
make a difference, and is therefore relevant to a woman's informed choice. In light of
this plurality's rejection of Roe's "fundamental right" approach to this
subject, the Court's contrary holding in Thornburgh is not controlling here. For the same
reason, this Court's previous holding invalidating a State's 24-hour mandatory waiting
period should not be followed. The waiting period helps ensure that a woman's decision to
abort is a well-considered one, and rationally furthers the State's legitimate interest in
maternal health and [505 U.S. 833, 841] in unborn life. It may delay, but does not
prohibit, abortions; and both it and the informed consent provisions do not apply in
medical emergencies. Pp. 966-970.
6. The statute's parental consent provision is entirely consistent
with this Court's previous decisions involving such requirements. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood Ass. of Kansas City, M., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476. It is reasonably
designed to further the State's important and legitimate interest "in the welfare of
its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes
impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely." Hodgson, supra, at 444.
Pp. 970-971.
7. Section 3214(a)'s requirement that abortion facilities file a
report on each abortion is constitutional, because it rationally furthers the State's
legitimate interests in advancing the state of medical knowledge concerning maternal
health and prenatal life, in gathering statistical information with respect to patients,
and in ensuring compliance with other provisions of the Act, while keeping the reports
completely confidential. Public disclosure of other reports made by facilities receiving
public funds - those identifying the facilities and any parent, subsidiary, or affiliated
organizations, § 3207(b), and those revealing the total number of abortions performed,
broken down by trimester, 3214(f) - are rationally related to the State's legitimate
interest in informing taxpayers as to who is benefiting from public funds and what
services the funds are supporting; and records relating to the expenditure of public funds
are generally available to the public under Pennsylvania law. Pp. 976-977.
JUSTICE SCALIA, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and
JUSTICE THOMAS, concluded that a woman's decision to abort her unborn child is not a
constitutionally protected "liberty," because (1) the Constitution says
absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have
permitted it to be legally proscribed. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring). The Pennsylvania statute should be
upheld in its entirety under the rational basis test. Pp. 979-981.
O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C,
and VI, in which BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part V-E,
in which STEVENS, J., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV, V-B, and V-D.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. BLACKMUN, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part, post, p. 911. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part, in which [*842] WHITE, SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined,
post, p. 922. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post,
p. 979.
Kathryn Kolbert argued the cause for petitioners in No. 91-744
and respondents in No. 91-902. With her on the briefs were Janet Benshoof, Lynn M.
Paltrow, Rachael N. Pine, Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, Linda J. Wharton, and Carol
E. Tracy.
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued
the cause for respondents in No. 91-744 and petitioners in No. 91-902. With him on the
brief were John G. Knorr III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Kate L.
Mershimer, Senior Deputy Attorney General.
Solicitor General Starr argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae in support of respondents in No. 91-744 and petitioners in No. 91-902.
With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
Thomas G. Hungar, and Alfred R. Mollin. †
==========Begin Footnotes==========
† [505 U.S. 833, 842] Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the
State of New York et al. by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Jerry Boone,
Solicitor General, Mary Ellen Burns, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Sanford M.
Cohen, Donna I. Dennis, Marjorie Fujiki, and Shelley B. Mayer, Assistant Attorneys
General, and John McKernan, Governor of Maine, and Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General,
Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney
General of Delaware, Warren Price III, Attorney General of Hawaii, Roland W. Burris,
Attorney General of Illinois, Bonnie J. Campbell, Attorney General of Iowa, J. Joseph
Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of
Massachusetts, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Robert J. Del Tufo,
Attorney General of New Jersey, Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, Lacy H.
Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, James E. O'Neil, Attorney General of Rhode
Island, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of
Vermont, and John Payton, Corporation Counsel of District of Columbia; for the State of
Utah by R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, and Mary Anne Q. Wood, Special Assistant
Attorney General; for the city of New York et al. by O. Peter Sherwood, Conrad Harper,
Janice Goodman, Leonard J. Koerner, Lorna Bade Goodman, Gail Rubin, and Julie Mertus; for
178 Organizations by Pamela S. [505 U.S. 833, 843] Karlan and Sarah Weddington; for
Agudath Israel of America by David Zwiebel; for the Alan Guttmacher Institute et al. by
Colleen K. Connell and Dorothy B. Zimbrakos; for the American Academy of Medical Ethics by
Joseph W. Dellapenna; for the American Association of Pro-life Obstetricians and
Gynecologists et al. by William Bentley Ball, Philip J. Murren, and Maura K. Quinlan; for
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Ann
E. Allen, Laurie R. Rockett, Joel I. Klein, Nadine Taub, and Sarah C. Carey; for the
American Psychological Association by David W. Ogden; for Texas Black Americans for Life
by Lawrence J. Joyce and Craig H. Greenwood; for Catholics United for Life et al. by
Thomas Patrick Monaghan, Jay Alan Sekulow, Walter M. Weber, Thomas A. Glessner, Charles E.
Rice, and Michael J. Laird; for the Elliot Institute for Social Sciences Research by
Stephen R. Kaufmann; for Feminists for Life of America et al. by Keith A. Fournier, John
G. Stepanovich, Christine Smith Torre, Theodore H. Amshoff, Jr., and Mary Dice Grenen; for
Focus on the Family et al. by Stephen H. Galebach, Gregory J. Granitto, Stephen W. Reed,
David L. Llewellyn, Jr., Benjamin W. Bull, and Leonard J. Pranschke; for the Knights of
Columbus by Carl A. Anderson; for Life Issues Institute by James Bopp, Jr., and Richard E.
Coleson; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by Julius L.
Chambers, Ronald L. Ellis, and Alice L. Brown; for the National Legal Foundation by Robert
K. Skolrood; for National Right to Life, Inc., by Messrs. Bopp and Coleson, Robert A.
Destro, and A. Eric Johnston; for the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence et
al. by Phyllis Gelman; for the Rutherford Institute et al. by Thomas W. Strahan, John W.
Whitehead, Mr. Johnston, Stephen E. Hurst, Joseph Secola, Thomas S. Neuberger, J. Brian
Heller, Amy Dougherty, Stanley R. Jones, David Melton, Robert R. Melnick, William Bonner,
W. Charles Bundren, and James Knicely; for the Southern Center for Law & Ethics by
Tony G. Miller; for the United States Catholic Conference et al. by Mark E. Chopko,
Phillip H. Harris, Michael K. Whitehead, and Forest D. Montgomery; for University Faculty
for Life by Clarke D. Forsythe and Victor G. Rosenblum; for Certain American State
Legislators by Paul Benjamin Linton; for 19 Arizona Legislators by Ronald D. Maines; for
Representative Henry J. Hyde et al. by Albert P. Blaustein and Kevin J. Todd; for
Representative Don Edwards et al. by Walter Dellinger and Lloyd N. Cutler; and for 250
American Historians by Sylvia A. Law. [505 U.S. 833, 843]
==========End Footnotes==========
